A large-scale study, “Dividing Lines in Ukrainian Society: The Impact of Mass Discussions in Social Media,” based on hundreds of high-reach posts across eight major controversies, quantifies how social media reflect divisions in wartime Ukraine and intensifies them somehow.
Across all analyzed topics - from mobilization debates to corruption scandals - one emotion dominates with statistical clarity: anger.
In every single conflict case examined, anger exceeded 60% of emotional expression. In some discussions, it climbed above 90% with the main target either they were the direct perpetrators of the criticized phenomena, without generalizations (such as bloggers or the suspect in the murder of a TCC soldier), or the authorities, more or less personalized. In other words, no social group was ever at the top of the accusations.
The numbers reveal how attention clusters around certain dividing lines. The “cardboard protests”, triggered by legislation threatening the independence of anti-corruption bodies, generated approximately 88.2 million in total reach among just 554 analyzed posts. By comparison, the highly sensitive debate over decriminalizing unauthorized abandonment of military units (UAU) reached 41.5 million users across 351 posts. The refugee departure-and-return discussion, though emotionally explosive, reached a comparatively smaller 6.3 million across 351 posts.
The implication is striking: the most attention accumulates where the future of the state and the conduct of the war are directly covered. Political scandals and mobilization policy dominate the informational battlefield.
Russian involvement follows this pattern. The most substantial presence of pro-Russian actors was observed in debates surrounding draft laws No. 12414, which sparked the so-called “cardboard protests”, and No. 13260 on the decriminalization of unauthorized abandonment of a unit. In the case of the protests, pro-Russian channels did not hide their interest in internal turbulence. Their messaging operated on two parallel tracks: discrediting the protesters as manipulated or naïve, while simultaneously portraying the authorities as weak, corrupt, or illegitimate.
At the same time, these actors highlighted what they framed as selective outrage - pointing out that no comparable mobilization occurred against the Territorial Recruitment Centers, often derogatorily labeled “man catchers.” This narrative later resurfaced in discussions about permitting young men to travel abroad, where claims that the government feared renewed street protests became a recurring argumentative motif.
Perhaps the most emotionally toxic line appears in debates over those who left Ukraine and those who stayed. This topic recorded one of the highest shares of hate speech among all cases. Unlike political scandals, where criticism targets institutions, here hostility becomes moralized. Yet even in this space, the state remains a frequent object of accusation - blamed simultaneously for preventing departures and for failing to create conditions for return.
Another revealing metric concerns the possibility of reconciliation. In most disputes, posts expressing understanding of an opponent’s position represented only a small minority share of total coverage. The data show categorical positioning dominates. Exceptions exist - particularly among military elites and intellectual figures - but compromise remains statistically rare.
The mobilization debate around UAU illustrates this vividly. Civilian authorities and senior military leadership were the most criticized categories in that discussion. The anger here was not anti-army; it was anti-management. Even among critics of policy, the debate revolved around how to strengthen defense capacity rather than whether to defend at all. This distinction matters.
Platform data further clarify the landscape. Telegram has become the primary arena for these disputes, hosting both pro-Ukrainian news channels and pro-Russian networks. YouTube is rapidly approaching similar influence, especially through media broadcasts. Facebook, once dominant, now plays a secondary role. The architecture of conflict has shifted toward faster, more anonymous, and more campaign-friendly ecosystems.
One of the most intriguing findings is the emergence of what researchers describe as “hating the haters.”
Rather than targeting large demographic groups, users increasingly direct hostility at perceived manipulators - radical politicians, propagandists, or outrage entrepreneurs. This recursive hostility fuels escalation without necessarily fragmenting society along ethnic or linguistic lines.
The study ultimately suggests something counterintuitive. Despite the overwhelming dominance of anger - above 60% in every conflict and up to 90% in some - Ukrainian society is not fracturing along identity lines. Hate from social groups has decreased significantly. The only top "social" addressee of hate is "those who left Ukraine." But the government, as in 2022, remains the main object of criticism.
If 2022 was the year of existential unity under invasion, 2025 is the year of argumentative resilience. Ukrainians are fighting externally - and simultaneously contesting power internally. The percentages show that outrage is intense, but it is focused.
The most significant dividing line today is not between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens, nor between regions. It is between expectations of the state and perceptions of its performance.
In a country at war, the loudest internal arguments are no longer about survival itself. They are about how survival is governed. The central dividing line today runs between citizens’ expectations and their assessment of state performance. In this sense, the loudest internal disputes are signs of a politically mobilized society negotiating the terms of its endurance under war.
The research was conducted by the NGO CAT-UA team at the request of Internews Ukraine as part of the project “Strengthening Truthfulness, Transparency, and Democracy to Counter Disinformation,” implemented with the support of the Government of Canada.
