According to Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Russia has been planning a full-scale invasion for approximately 15 years, since 2007.
Thus, it has become extremely adept at weaponising various areas of state functioning, from communications to natural resources.
However, in this article, we look at how the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to de-occupy Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts, limit the weaponisation of the Black Sea, and defend food security from Russian terrorism.
Ivan Kyrychevsky, a military expert at Defense Express Media & Consulting Company, told UkraineWorld that the de-occupation of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts was based on three similar elements:
"Firstly, the Russian assault groups were quite small-scaled, and it would have been possible to bring them quite quickly to a certain stage of exhaustion, when they were no longer able to attack back, that is, to conduct land assaults."
In 2022, Russian groups totalled 200-250 thousand soldiers along the entire 400-kilometre-long front line.
"Secondly, we managed to conduct a swift force deployment to launch an attack," continues Ivan Kyrychevsky.
The dominance of drones on both sides, which manifested itself in the second half of 2023, made it impossible to conduct these hostilities now.
"Thirdly, Ukraine's Armed Forces were able to carry out these attacks without information spillover," the expert concludes.
Unfortunately, the pattern that worked in 2022 is unlikely to be used now, as the war has evolved technologically and there are now more Russian troops along the frontlines.
According to the Royal United Services Institute in the United Kingdom, Russia has 470,000 "bayonets" that have increased by approximately 120,000 in the last year.
Nevertheless, Ukraine repelled the Russians from a Black Sea landing.
Following the unjust division of the Black Sea Fleet under the Kharkiv Agreements of 2010 and the occupation of Crimea, Russia has been renewing its fleet to strengthen its maritime position.
According to UK Defence Secretary Grant Shapps, 20% of Russia's Black Sea Fleet has been destroyed over the past four months.
However, according to Pavlo Lakiychuk's opinion, Head of Security Programmes at the Strategy XXI Centre for Global Studies expressed in an interview with UkraineWorld, that "it is not entirely accurate to measure Russia's losses in terms of quantity, as this is a rather vague indicator."
If we take the total number of the Black Sea Fleet, as of February 2022, there were approximately 286 ships: "this list includes the cruiser Moskva and the rescue ship Komuna dated back to 1906, as well as garbage collectors," adds Pavlo Lakiychuk.
The best way to measure quality is to look at combat capability, or the tasks that the fleet is capable of performing.
At the beginning of the war, the Black Sea Fleet had four tasks, which the expert identifies as: "A naval blockade of the Ukrainian coast and ports. Second, it was to assist the ground forces in the coastal area, by providing artillery fire, transport, and ensuring troops and cargo transportation."
This task can only be partially fulfilled, since they are only masters of the Azov Sea, not other maritime locations.
The third task is a seaborne assault.
Pavlo Lakiychuk told UkraineWorld that "in order to carry out such an operation, the Russians were preparing back in 2021, conducting huge exercises at the Opuk training ground in Crimea, which involved not only ships from the Black Sea Fleet but also from the Northern Fleet.
This task was not completed because Ukraine was able to timely organise a strong coastal defence."
The fourth task was to launch missile strikes deep into Ukrainian territory against strategic targets, using naval aircraft and ships. Russia continues to employ this capability.
Accordingly, they are unable to perform two out of the four tasks, but are partially able to perform one task, however fully capable of performing the other.
From this perspective, the Black Sea Fleet's capabilities have decreased by 60-65%.
In addition, we should highlight the role of Türkiye, which, after the full-scale invasion began, prohibited the return of Russian warships from the Mediterranean Sea to their bases.
Although Article 19 of the Montreux Convention states that ships in wartime have the right to return to their permanent basing areas, Türkiye prevented them from doing so, using another article of the Convention on the threat to its national security.
As it stands, these ships are still unable to return to Russian military bases.
Ukraine demonstrated what would happen if Russian warships were to enter the Black Sea.
Let's recall the destruction of the Russian flagship Moskva in April 2022 - the largest warship sunk in combat since the sinking of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano in 1982 during the Falklands War.
Subsequently, the Ukrainian military pushed Russian troops off Snake Island (Zmiinyi Island), which allowed for the strengthening of the Black Sea export route, Ukraine's third major achievement in two years.
According to Minister of Development of Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure of Ukraine, Oleksandr Kubrakov, export volumes have returned to pre-war levels.
Mykhailo Nepran, First Vice President of the Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, told in an interview with UkraineWorld: "the opening of the Black Sea by the Ukrainian Armed Forces was key to freeing our exports".
At the same time, we do not have a guaranteed risk-free option for doing business, as Russia has the ability to attack from the Caspian Sea, for example.
However, there was another major risk: no ship would sail without insurance.
Mykhailo Nepran told, "thanks to our allies, in particular the United Kingdom, an international insurance consortium has been established to insure our ships. It includes the Ukrainian government and large insurance companies."
Clearly, when Russia blocked Ukraine's food exports, this was part of geopolitical rivalry, with Russia attempting to depict Ukraine as an unreliable partner to later sweep in and occupy all export business.
Mykhailo Nepran told UkraineWorld that evidence of this is seen from the Africa-Russia forum, where Putin offered the African countries to purchase food from Russia and provide 25-50 thousand tonnes of grain free of charge to those willing to cooperate with Russia.
For some time, the grain corridor operated under UN auspices, but in July 2023, Russia unilaterally withdrew from it.
Although the agreement on the Black Sea Initiative food from three Ukrainian ports - Odesa, Pivdenne, and Chornomorsk - played to Moscow's advantage as it not only avoided sanctions on its grain exports, but also received money for the stolen Ukrainian grain, seized in 2022 by the Russian invaders in the occupied territories of Ukraine's southeastern territories.
Alternative export routes to the European Union have long been developed through Romania, Bulgaria, Danube ports, or railways.
However, thanks to the above-described efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to deweaponise the Black Sea, Ukraine returned to pre-war sea export volumes in January 2023.
Last year, at a security conference in Munich, President Zelensky referenced the biblical story of David and Goliath.
After David stunned Goliath with his sling, he beheaded his opponent. The morale is not only to neutralise, but to prevent rejuvenation.
In each of the three cases of Ukraine's victories, the Armed Forces did not use an asymmetrical response, but seized the initiative.
This is how the perception of Ukraine's victory should shift: from "preventing Russia from winning" to "supporting Ukraine in its victory".
