To find this out UkraineWorld asked Mykhailo Gonchar, Founder & President of the CGS STRATEGY XXI, Chief Editor of the BLACK SEA SECURITY Journal.
Overall, the goal is to achieve an energy collapse in Ukraine, especially during periods of the lowest temperatures — that is, a scenario of cold extermination. In the 1930s of the last century, Ukraine was subjected to the Holodomor; now Russia wants to impose a “Kholodomor” (Genocide through cold weather). This goal, in principle, has existed since the winter of 2022–2023; they simply believed at the time that it could be achieved fairly easily. That series of massive missile and drone strikes against the facilities of Ukraine’s unified energy system was aimed at exactly this objective.
However, it turned out that not everything was as easy to achieve as they had imagined. Then they somewhat changed their approaches, took a pause, and such mass attacks — already in a more expanded version of strike means — were resumed, involving not only Shahed-type drones and cruise missiles, but also ballistic missiles. This occurred in 2024, moreover during the spring–summer–autumn period, that is, during extremes of high temperatures in summer. And strikes were carried out not only against facilities of the unified power system, that is, key substations, but also against generation — thermal power plants and hydroelectric power plants. That is, there was already a more systemic and comprehensive approach to hitting everything that generates and transmits electricity.
This also failed. Despite the damage inflicted both during the winter of 2022-2023 and in 2024, the energy system retained functionality. Yes, we lost part of thermal generation — the larger part — and up to half of hydropower generation, but some things were restored, some were restarted, and one way or another, during the autumn–winter season of 2025-2026 we had a situation that was critical, but there was no energy deficit.
With the very first Russian strikes, this energy deficit arose immediately. Moreover, it arose on a large scale as a result of fairly effective strikes carried out against the energy system and generation, where the enemy already had an understanding of what had been restored, what was protected, what was not protected, and how to act further.
A feature of the current strike campaign is an attempt, in essence, to finish off our generation completely. In the autumn of 2025, the Russians tried not so much to strike across the entire territory of Ukraine, but concentrated strikes on energy-sensitive regions of the East, Central Ukraine, and the Left Bank, so to speak. Yes, an intermediate goal was clearly set and continues to be set — to divide the Left Bank and the Right Bank in the sense of eliminating the connection that links Right-Bank Ukraine with the Left Bank.
At present, we have a situation where the main energy generation is concentrated on the Right Bank — first and foremost, this refers to three nuclear power plants: Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and South Ukraine, with nine power units. Meanwhile, the Left Bank, due to the destruction of almost all thermal generation and damage to hydropower generation, remains practically without electricity-generating facilities, and only from the Right Bank, via appropriate high-voltage lines, can electricity be transmitted to the Left Bank.
That is, the Left Bank is experiencing a total deficit. The Right Bank also lives under deficit conditions, but it is clear that the main generation is here, on the Right Bank, at nuclear power plants, and therefore the situation here is somewhat different, although very uneven. Thus, yes, they are trying to cut off the Left Bank from the Right Bank in energy terms and deliver the greatest number of strikes, totally destroying all energy facilities — not only the unified energy system of Ukraine, but also local distribution networks, what we call Oblenergos.
Hence the systematic strikes on Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Chernihiv Oblasts — that is, all frontline or border regions of Ukraine — where, according to the concept or approach announced by Putin last summer, it is supposedly necessary to create a “security zone” along the border between Russia and Ukraine.
In this sense, the energy components of this “security zone” essentially look like the total destruction of all energy facilities in order to bleed Ukraine dry logistically — primarily railway logistics, which plays a key role both in supplying Ukraine’s defense forces and, in general, in fulfilling the transport function to support the population living on the Left Bank.
Thus, this is a fairly complex and systemic approach. And if we also take into account that total destruction is applied not only to facilities that generate or transmit electricity, but also to combined heat and power plants (CHPPs), which primarily generate heat and only then electricity — that is, cogeneration — then strikes on CHPPs are, in essence, genocidal actions aimed at the total destruction of the civilian population, which under low-temperature conditions has no other option for heating except receiving heat from CHPPs, which are now practically destroyed or already destroyed, as in Kharkiv or Chernihiv.
Based on these four years of experience, they came to the conclusion of how this can be done under conditions where the United States, the Trump administration, so to speak, sees in Putin’s intentions a readiness for peace. Therefore, Putin allows himself to act completely free-handed. His hands are untied; he understands perfectly well that nothing will happen to him, and what European politicians say does not concern him at all, because he does not expect any counteraction from Europe. If Russia succeeds in a scenario of isolating our nuclear capacities — nuclear generation capacities — from the energy system, this will essentially mean the collapse of the energy system, what is called a total blackout. Russia is now precisely focused on this. It cannot be said that this is their first attempt. The most systemic approach, which to some extent was successful, was the strike on August 26, 2024, against Ukrenergo operator substations, which play a key role in terms of supplying energy flow from nuclear power plant units into the unified grid of Ukraine.
This is dangerous not only because nuclear generation is deprived of access to the grid, but also because of abnormal triggering of the algorithm for disconnecting a nuclear power unit from the grid under conditions of load disappearance. This threatens a nuclear incident. Russia’s calculation was unsuccessful. However, this does not mean they will not attempt it again. They will continue trying. And, in fact, it now seems that this is their main objective.
This is because Ukrainian energy today rests practically on these three pillars — three nuclear power plants: Rivne, South Ukraine, and Khmelnytskyi — which currently generate approximately at least 70% of all electricity for Ukraine.
And this electricity, incidentally, cannot be distributed evenly across all regions. As I noted, the Right Bank can receive more electricity due to the configuration of the energy system than the Left Bank, which they are trying to cut off — and quite successfully.
Therefore, there is a dual objective here. On the one hand, the Russians want to provoke a nuclear incident at at least one reactor, without delivering direct strikes on nuclear power plants. On the other hand, if successful, they want to isolate nuclear generation from the energy system, which would sharply worsen the situation for consumers in Ukraine — in essence, bleeding the Ukrainian economy dry, because without energy, no industry can function.
Of course, many facilities have emergency power supply systems, but if we are talking about large-scale industry, then, frankly, no generators can ensure that. One way or another, this will certainly have very serious consequences for Ukrainian consumers and for ordinary citizens, households, and large apartment complexes in major cities. And we already see this in the example of Kyiv, which is probably the most energy-deficient city at present.
Russia’s calculation, in principle, is to force Ukrainian society as a whole — broadly speaking, through the authorities — to accept the conditions framed as a peace agreement, which in fact masks Ukraine’s capitulation. Of course, this calculation is absolutely erroneous, but Russians, in their characteristic manner, believe that if it did not work in 2022, did not work in 2023, did not work in 2024, did not work in 2025, then it will work in 2026. Therefore, they continue and will continue their efforts to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure regardless of anything.
As for Trump’s initiatives, such as a one-week energy ceasefire, this is simply absurd. There is no ceasefire in reality, because refraining from strikes does not automatically mean a ceasefire. It simply means stockpiling munitions for further strikes.
There are no invulnerable energy systems, or systems of any kind. Therefore, yes, the resilience margin of Ukraine’s energy system was quite large, which allowed us to get through the winter of 2022–2023 and the summer attacks of 2024. But reserves are not unlimited. It is impossible to replenish them quickly, or to repair, for example, a destroyed power unit of a thermal power plant — especially when there is nothing left to repair and replacement is essentially required.
Our foreign partners have done an extraordinary amount to help us — starting with, for example, the supply and transportation to Ukraine of power units from thermal power plants that are no longer in use, for instance in Lithuania, Poland, or Germany, and ending with a large quantity of transformer equipment, in particular to replace damaged units. Yes, to a large extent, engineering protection was implemented, which, incidentally, was very important, because if that engineering protection of Ukrenergo substations had not been implemented, today’s situation would look completely different — we would already be in a total blackout.
However, one way or another, repaired or newly installed equipment also came under attack, especially ballistic strikes, which cause severe destruction. For example, second-level engineering protection — that is, an arched reinforced concrete structure — reliably protects a high-voltage transformer even in the case of a direct hit by a Shahed-type attack drone, meaning the transformer remains practically undamaged. But in the case of a ballistic missile strike, the situation looks completely different.
At present, Russia has accumulated a certain stockpile of ballistic and cruise missiles and is delivering increasingly painful strikes. And, of course, the energy system is operating under conditions of practically no reserve capacity and under low-temperature conditions. Over the previous decade, winters in Ukraine were generally warm. It cannot be said that the current winter is abnormally cold, but nevertheless these are low temperatures — around minus 20 degrees Celsius, and in eastern regions even lower, down to minus 30. These also affect the operation of the energy system.
In addition, heavy snowfalls and the accumulation of wet snow and ice on wires lead to the breaking of high-voltage transmission lines, and a system that is already operating in an abnormal mode sustains additional damage due to meteorological factors. This leads to non-design, critical situations in the operation of the energy system. Dispatchers are forced to urgently disconnect large groups of consumers. In turn, this creates overloads on those nodes of the energy system that continue to function.
A vivid example is the situation on January 31, when, precisely due to meteorological factors and wet snow accumulation, a 400 kV transmission line connecting Ukraine with Moldova and Romania was broken. As a result, a non-design cascading reaction of emergency shutdowns spread across the entire energy system. At first, it was thought that this was a total blackout. Nuclear power units at several nuclear power plants began to reduce load, but ultimately it turned out that the situation was brought under control and did not lead to an extremely negative outcome. By the end of the day, the situation was corrected.
However, it was corrected in the sense that the energy system retained functionality, but it continues to operate in abnormal modes. Therefore, undoubtedly, the coming days — both in terms of extreme temperatures and Russian attacks — will be important and decisive in determining whether the energy system can withstand the pressure, or whether it will fragment into energy islands.
The fragmentation of the energy system into energy islands does not mean a final catastrophe, but, of course, there will be a total deterioration of the situation under still-low temperatures. Therefore, the situation will certainly be worse than it is today. Electricity supply will become even more uneven depending on the region. And it is obvious that restoration will require not weeks, but probably months. The situation will be extremely difficult.
Under these circumstances, in principle, it can be said that Russia is also working through elements of a future war with Europe — where prolonged carpet bombings will not be necessary, but rather certain pinpoint strikes on specific nodes of energy systems. And, taking into account the fact that European energy systems, due to their business-oriented design and architecture from the very beginning, do not have the capacity reserves that existed in the Ukrainian energy system, European energy infrastructure would a priori be doomed to collapse.
Hypothetically, yes, it is possible. But Russia’s energy system is, on the one hand, more vulnerable because it is more complex and hierarchical. They have the concept of a “Unified Energy System of Russia,” which consists of seven integrated energy systems by macro-regions: the Northwest Unified Energy System, the Central Russia Unified Energy System, the Southern Russia Unified Energy System, the Urals, and the Far East. That is, each energy system is sufficiently autonomous, interconnected by relevant interconnectors, and they operate in this mode as a single energy system for all of Russia.
There is a sufficiently large reserve of capacity both in generation and electricity transmission. Given the scale of Russia, to do the same thing that they have done in Ukraine would require an order of magnitude more strike assets. And these strike assets would have to include not only drones, which cannot achieve much on their own, but also cruise missiles. We essentially have only one such system — Neptune — and ballistic missiles, of which we currently have almost none. I am not taking into account isolated uses of new systems in testing mode.
That is, without strike assets with powerful warheads weighing not tens of kilograms, but several times more, it is unrealistic to talk about inflicting serious damage on Russia’s energy systems. Although certain strikes have taken place and produce some local effect, Moscow and the Kremlin are absolutely indifferent to that. The fact that somewhere in Belgorod, Oryol, Kursk, Krasnodar, or elsewhere — including, incidentally, Murmansk due to technical problems — people are without heat and electricity does not concern them at all. If they are willing to sacrifice millions on the front line, millions of human lives, then the fact that someone somewhere freezes or suffers in some other way is of no concern to them whatsoever.
Therefore, in this case, what is sensitive — and what the Defense Forces of Ukraine use quite successfully — is strikes not against the electric power infrastructure, but against oil infrastructure, because oil is the main perpetuum mobile of Russian aggression in all respects: in terms of financing the war budget and in terms of social provision.
Here it is worth noting that 2025 became the first year when, by the conditional ratio of oil revenues to military expenditures, Russia for the first time entered a zone of fragility, where military needs and expenditures exceed what oil and petroleum product exports can provide. This is the first time in Russia’s history. Previously, military expenditures amounted to roughly one-third to one-half of oil revenues. In 2025, this figure jumped to 102 percent. Oil revenues no longer cover military needs. In 2026, the situation will deepen further.
Therefore, by striking oil export infrastructure, oil refining facilities, or hunting tankers that transport or may transport Russian oil, the Defense Forces of Ukraine essentially reduce export revenues, increase military risks, and raise overhead costs. This is our asymmetric response to Russia’s genocidal actions.
In this context, Russia’s support for Trump’s initiative on an “energy ceasefire” is, of course, motivated first by a desire to please Trump, to show that “friend Vladimir” appreciates his efforts. And second, because cold temperatures currently exist not only in Ukraine, but also in the Northwest region of Russia, where the situation in large cities is already poor even without Ukrainian strikes. I have already mentioned Murmansk, where due to a technical accident — and not only in Murmansk, but in many other cities as well — the situation is similar, because no capital investments or repairs of local heating networks and power infrastructure have been carried out during the years of war, as all resources have been fed into the war furnace. Accordingly, under low temperatures, everything begins to crack and burst, and heat and electricity disappear.
Therefore, I think that once again there are concerns in the Kremlin that under conditions of low temperatures, there could be corresponding actions by the Defense Forces of Ukraine, which could lead to much more serious consequences, damage, and additional problems.
In fact, it depends both on meteorological factors and, above all, on the consequences of further strikes on energy system facilities and generation assets, and on how nuclear power plants will operate going forward.
In this context, a general picture can be drawn: at the peak of winter cold, Ukraine needs approximately a little over 18 gigawatts of generating capacity. We have — and the President has cited these figures — 11 gigawatts, including 2.4 gigawatts that we can receive from the European energy system. Ukraine’s energy system has been part of the European one since 2022, so this electricity import is already included. In practice, we lack nearly half of the necessary generating capacity.
But the point is not simply that overall capacity is about half of what is needed and that one can somehow survive. The problem is that electricity generated by these surviving capacities cannot be evenly distributed across all of Ukraine. Due to the nature of any energy system in any country, uniform distribution is impossible, because generation itself is uneven both in capacity and in location.
As I said, the three main nuclear power plants are all located on the Right Bank, and the entire configuration of the energy system is more favorable for distributing this generation primarily to the Right Bank. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which no longer operates, primarily supplied the Left Bank. This is the reason for the major energy deficit in the industrial regions of Central and Eastern Ukraine. From this perspective, the situation will look even more bleak.
We currently see a campaign of assistance to Ukraine from our European partners — intensive deliveries of spare parts for substations, equipment, materials, generation units for households, cogeneration installations — but, unfortunately, this will not provide a quick rescue. Because, for example, in the case of a non-functioning combined heat and power plant in Kyiv that supplies half the city with heat and electricity, it is impossible to replace this single CHPP (Combined Heat and Power plant) with, figuratively speaking, a thousand mini-CHPPs or cogeneration units to perform the same function. For one simple reason: heat transmission networks are designed for this mega-CHPP, not for a multitude of small cogeneration units.
Therefore, Russia’s calculation in this context is based on the assumption that despite the assistance provided to Ukraine, Ukrainians will still be unable to secure even a minimal level of thermal comfort. As a result, there would be public protests against the authorities, demands to meet Russia halfway — in essence, to capitulate. This is a false assumption, but Russians have their own perception of Ukrainians and of the resilience of Ukrainian society. And therefore they will continue to act accordingly.
And we must do our part — destroy their infrastructure, especially given that, as I have already noted, Russia’s economy has entered a zone of fragility not merely hypothetically, but in practice.
