Life in Kherson is survival under constant artillery fire and drone attacks, and perhaps a glimpse of the future into which the entire continent is gradually sinking. In this city, where a simple trip for bread or a ride in a minibus has turned into a game of roulette due to FPV drones "hunting" civilians, the 20th-century illusion of the existence of a safe rear has completely shattered. Kherson clearly demonstrates that we are moving into a world where absolute security is no longer guaranteed to anyone, and the line between a combat zone and a peaceful city has completely blurred.
For decades, EU countries built their civil security systems around the concept of Emergency Management
— predictable natural disasters or industrial accidents. This model relied on a bureaucratic vertical, slow response protocols, and centralized state institutions. It proved completely helpless against the threat of total war of both low and high intensity, where civilian infrastructure is not an accidental victim, but the enemy's primary target.
Previously, civil protection waited for a signal from state sirens. Today, the total dronification of the frontlines and frontline cities requires solutions at the level of each individual person.
A striking example of this is the creation of portable radio frequency spectrum analyzers — pocket drone detectors, such as "Chuyka" or "Tsukorok". Originally created for the military, these devices are massively entering civilian life in frontline regions. When a civilian volunteer, an electrician, or an ambulance driver in Kherson or Kharkiv has a compact detector on their belt that warns with sound about the approach of an FPV drone or "Mavic" several hundred meters away, it changes the chances of survival.
Moreover, this integrates with digital services. Ukrainians have created a unique culture of early warning: from the "Air Raid Alert" application and official SES notifications to multi-level monitoring systems in the "Diia" application and crowdsourced Telegram channels that visualize the movement of "Shaheds" and missiles in real time. This allows citizens to take care of their safety in advance. This is crucial because Russia intentionally conducts prolonged alerts throughout the day to dull the sense of security, make the day unpredictable, and halt everyday work.
Civil protection in EU countries has always relied on the stability of centralized power grids. Ukrainian experience has shown that massive strikes on the energy system are capable of paralyzing infrastructure within a few hours.
In response, a culture of autonomy emerged in Ukraine thanks to backup systems, Invincibility Centers, and mobile shelters. From household charging stations and generators in every coffee shop to collective power systems based on solar panels and energy storage for hospitals and pump stations.
Invincibility Centers brought together state resources, private business, and volunteers, turning ordinary facilities into islands of autonomous survival with heat, power, and communication reserves (Starlink).
Moving away from the idea of large underground bunkers in favor of modular above-ground concrete shelters located at public transport stops and crowded places provides protection from cluster munitions and shrapnel within seconds after an alert signal. Of course, there are not many of these in Ukraine yet, but the idea itself is developing.
Digital services have become basic security infrastructure.
The integration of refugee housing algorithms, digital recording of damaged property via "Diia", electronic maps of shelters and safe havens, interactive notification systems — all of this allowed avoiding chaos during massive waves of evacuation. Evacuation in the Ukrainian context became not just housing people in camps, but a dynamic process of horizontal redistribution of the population involving charitable foundations, volunteer vehicle fleets, and railway infrastructure.
Some of this is already being adapted by EU countries.
Germany, Poland, and the Baltic states have launched a large-scale audit and overhaul of underground parking lots, subways, and abandoned shelters, as well as the development of standards for rapid modular shelters based on the Ukrainian model.
Finland and Sweden have updated their instructions for the population in case of war, but now they emphasize not only the actions of the army, but also the self-organization of the civilian population, such as stockpiling autonomous reserves of food, water, and power systems (generators and power banks) for at least 72 hours.
European states are actively integrating Cell Broadcast mobile emergency notification systems and studying the experience of the Ukrainian "Diia" mobile app and integrated threat monitoring systems to create unified digital situation centers.
The Baltic states and Poland are already studying the Ukrainian experience of protecting power substations using physical barriers (nets, gabions) and purchasing mobile EW equipment and drone detectors for units guarding civilian infrastructure.
The main idea that emerged during the Russian-Ukrainian war regarding civil defense is that civil protection is no longer a monopoly of the state.
Ukrainian experience has proven that the most effective security system of the future is a networked society, where every citizen possesses basic tactical medicine skills, owns threat detection devices, uses digital orientation tools, and is provided with basic energy autonomy. Ukraine is transforming European civil protection from passive expectation of help into active, technological, and resilient self-organization.
