We have highlighted the following key features: bilateral relations have become the only effective mechanism to bypass "institutional blackmail"; the formation of a multi-level "web" of bilateral obligations instead of an alliance "umbrella"; and the fact that ideological unions are giving way to transactional partnerships.
The post-Cold War world lived for a long time under the illusion of the "end of history" and the irreversibility of global multilateral cooperation (multilateralism). It was long believed that the future belonged to large alliances, universal organizations (UN, WTO, OSCE), and ideological blocs.
However, Russian aggression against Ukraine has finally proven what has been brewing for years: the global system of multipolarity has collapsed, and it is being replaced by the era of "nodal bilateralism."
The dependence on collective agreements within large alliances is gradually but inevitably shifting toward direct, pragmatic, and transactional bilateral agreements.
The main problem with modern alliances (from the UN Security Council to NATO and the EU) is the consensus model of decision-making. Bilateral relations have become the only effective mechanism for bypassing "institutional blackmail."
As analysts from the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS) point out, the modern world is faced with a situation where a single outlier state within an alliance (e.g., Hungary in the EU/NATO) can paralyze the will of dozens of other countries. Bilateral agreements allow coalitions to act quickly, bypassing the need for global consensus. States no longer want to depend on the weakest or most corrupt link in an alliance.
The system of bilateral security agreements that Ukraine has begun concluding with G7 countries and other partners (starting with the UK, Germany, France, etc.) is traditionally perceived as a temporary "substitute" or "waiting room" before joining NATO. However, it is worth noting here that the Ukrainian model of security agreements can be considered a new prototype of the global security architecture for the 21st century.
Instead of the monolithic "umbrella" of NATO's Article 5 (which has never been tested in a full-scale war between major powers), a multi-level "web" of bilateral obligations is forming. The Foreign Policy Council "Ukrainian Prism," analyzing these agreements, rightly points out their specificity: they stipulate exact funding amounts, weapons nomenclature, and joint production. It is more advantageous for modern states to have 5-7 reliable bilateral treaties with guaranteed financial and military support than an abstract promise from a bloc of 32 countries.
Volodymyr Horbulin has repeatedly emphasized that the symmetrical responses of old international structures no longer work, and those capable of asymmetrical, direct action will survive.
Today, alliances create standards, but weapons are forged by bilateral contracts. The focus is shifting from political guarantees to technological and defense-industrial alliances. Ukraine's bilateral agreements on localizing production with BAE Systems (UK) or Rheinmetall (Germany) provide stronger security guarantees than the memorandums of entire international assemblies. Technological sovereignty is becoming the foundation of diplomacy, and it is being built strictly in a bilateral "state-to-state" or "state-to-corporation" format.
Classic multipolarity assumed the presence of several centers of gravity (USA, China, EU, Global South), around which others rallied. Valerii Pekar and kmbs researchers often view modern processes as the collapse of old hierarchies and a transition to a networked, fragmented world. We can assume that ideological unions are giving way to transactional partnerships.
The states of the Global South (India, Türkiye, Brazil, Saudi Arabia) refuse to join rigid alliances either on the side of the West or on the side of the Russia-China-Iran axis. They choose "multi-vector bilateralism." They conclude agreements on technologies with some countries, on resources with others, and on security with yet others. This forms a flexible but highly cynical system where there are no permanent allies, only permanent interests, which are easiest to secure one-on-one.
What is happening in security is mirrored in the economy. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is in a coma. It is being replaced by the logic of friendshoring and direct trade corridors.
A vivid example is the Ukrainian grain corridor. When Russia destroyed the multilateral Black Sea Grain Initiative (under the auspices of the UN and with the participation of Türkiye), Ukraine did not rely on institutions. The Armed Forces of Ukraine asymmetrically cleared the waters, and Kyiv established direct, bilateral agreements with individual neighboring countries, insurance companies, and shipowners. This proved that direct action and bilateral pragmatism defeat global institutional mediation.
It is important to note that global alliances, such as NATO or the EU, are important for Ukraine precisely to create and maintain common norms. They are important, but the multipolar system itself is fragmenting.
Instead, the real "muscle mass" of international relations is flowing into bilateral agreements. This is a world where the speed of decision-making, technological exchange, and the readiness to act without looking back at the "concerns" of alliance partners become the main criteria for survival. And Ukraine, fighting for its existence, acts today not only as a recipient of this new architecture but also as a driver of change, proving that the matrix of bilateral agreements is much more viable than the illusion of collective security.
