The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, was not merely a regional conflict but a historic turning point that reshaped perceptions of international security, military doctrines, and the conduct of war.
This unprovoked act of aggression, which a senior British general described as “our 1937 moment”, saying that Britain must be ready to “fight and win” the threat from Russia, shattered the security architecture painstakingly constructed in Europe over decades, including multilateral commitments established over the past 30 years.
The scale of destruction continues to grow, accompanied by atrocities that meet criteria for war crimes and openly genocidal rhetoric on Russian state television.
The decisions by Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership directly reflect this reassessment, demonstrating that Russia’s aggression constitutes a real and immediate threat to its neighbors.
As Mykola Sungurovskyi, director of military programs at the Razumkov Centre, noted in an interview with UkraineWorld: “The Ukrainian Armed Forces have repeatedly demonstrated that the Russian army is not invincible. Repeated strikes by non-nuclear Ukraine on elements of Russia’s nuclear triad—radar installations, strategic bombers—prove that the Kremlin leadership is not only unprepared but fears the use of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Russian nuclear coercion still effectively influences NATO member states possessing nuclear weapons.”
The war has arrived on European soil, manifesting in Russia’s hybrid campaigns.
Hanna Shelest, director of the Security Studies Programme at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” and editor-in-chief of UA Ukraine Analytica, explained in a UkraineWorld podcast: “When Russia disrupts cables in the Baltics, jams and spoofs navigation near Sweden and Norway, deploys drones across the Nordic region, acquires property near Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian military bases, intervenes in elections, finances protests in Romania or Germany, and sponsors criminal networks in multiple countries, this is all hybrid warfare. When the Russians are intervening in the elections, paying for the protest in Romania or in Germany, sponsoring groups and establishing the context with the criminal and mafia in different countries.”
In May 2025, RAND Corporation published Dispersed, Disguised, and Degradable: The Implications of the Fighting in Ukraine for Future U.S.-Involved Conflicts for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Africa (USAFE–AFAFRICA), stating:
War is now perceived as controlled chaos, where success depends not on direct enemy destruction but on the ability to disorient through information dominance. This requires continuous adaptation and reevaluation of combat strategies across all domains.
Militaries are rapidly adapting to new technologies, but doctrines alone cannot fully alter fundamental principles of warfare.
As Glib Voloskyi, an analyst at the initiative centre of Comeback Alive, told in a podcast with UkraineWorld: “Infantry performs three primary roles. First, they control territory—without infantry in a city, no number of drones can truly control it. Second, they act as a shield, creating a line between advancing enemy forces and critical systems like command and control, drone operators, evacuation squads, and field hospitals. Even with strong fire superiority, fast-moving enemy units, such as motorcycles and buggies, can bypass defences; infantry pins down these forces to allow them to be destroyed by fire. Third, infantry conducts assaults, cleaning remaining enemy forces and establishing control. Currently, no technology can fully replace humans in these roles.”
Russian tactics are characterized by disregard for soldier lives, exemplified by “meat grinder” assaults.
Russian forces attempt to achieve numerical superiority using conscripts and prisoners, treating them as expendable while incurring massive losses.
The role of traditional armored units has dramatically shifted; mass tank assaults, once central to ground operations, have become excessively risky and ineffective.
According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the high attrition of Russian armored vehicles due to Ukrainian anti-tank defenses and widespread drone use forced Moscow to adapt its traditional tactics, transitioning from large-scale assaults to mobile group operations.
Glib Voloskyi further explained:
Three main pillars of the Russian strategy are as such. Firstly, they continue advance on the battlefield using their demographic resources and the overwhelming firepower. Secondly, they invest heavily in informational campaigns inside the Ukrainian military, but also conduct the combined air, drone and missiles attack on Ukrainian infrastructure and attempt to undermine the morale of Ukraine civilian population to keep fighting. And thirdly, they play on the diplomatic arena, trying to undermine their foreign support of the Ukrainian military.
Initially, Russia attempted a rapid seizure of key cities like Kyiv through blitzkrieg tactics
.
After this failed and Ukrainian forces repelled Russian troops from northern Ukraine, Moscow shifted to attritional warfare, deploying drone swarms along convoluted routes to penetrate Ukraine’s air defenses and electronic warfare systems.
Long-range drones have become emblematic of modern warfare: Shahed-136 for Russia, and “Lyut” and “Bobry” for Ukraine.
These UAVs target critical infrastructure with GPS-guided precision, striking depots, power stations, and bridges. Remarkably, their high efficiency is coupled with low cost - Shahed units cost roughly $30–50,000, compared to over $1 million for a Kalibr missile.
A particularly notable lesson is Ukraine’s use of FPV drones for reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and kamikaze strikes against armored units.
Official Ministry of Defense data indicate that in 2024, twice as many new Ukrainian weapons systems were approved compared to the previous year, including a significant share of drones, robotics, and munitions. FPV drones combine low cost, precision, and agility while reducing risk to personnel.
Ukraine has also innovated in naval warfare through unmanned surface platforms such as MAGURA V5 and Sea Baby, elements of a “mosquito fleet” that counter Russian naval assets in the Black Sea, preserving lives and limiting the operations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Drawing from this experience, Ukraine is developing the “Drone Line”
concept - a 10–15 km-wide no-go zone based on precision, flexibility, and technology, offering a model for future global defense.
Mykhailo Drapatyi, Commander of the Ground Forces and Head of the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group, noted that 80–90% of frontline defense now depends on UAV capabilities.
At the core of Ukraine’s network-centric warfare is the Delta situational awareness system, a NATO-standard ecosystem enabling real-time planning, digital intelligence sharing, and multi-source data integration.
Built on a zero-trust security model (“trust no one, verify everything”), it has proven decisive in operations ranging from the sinking of the cruiser Moskva to the liberation of Snake Island.
The Russian-Ukrainian war has provided the world with key lessons that are reshaping security paradigms.
It has shown that war remains possible even in central Europe; that traditional doctrines struggle under modern technological pressures
; and that innovation, societal mobilization, and international support can counterbalance even the military might of a nuclear state.
The primary conclusion is that security can no longer rely on outdated assumptions: it requires new collective defense models, technological adaptation, and global solidarity. Ukraine’s victory will not only be a national triumph but also a demonstration of the viability of a rules-based international order over brute force.
