On June 19, the President of Ukraine publicly called on Belarusian authorities to shut down communication relay stations allegedly used to support Russian drone strikes against Ukraine. Within days, Zelenskyy stated that those relay stations stopped functioning
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At first glance, the episode may look insignificant, but it points to a much bigger picture. These relay stations are not the only way the Kremlin uses the Minsk administration to support its war against Ukraine:
from the launch of the initial assault on Kyiv to serving as a rear logistics corridor during Russia's withdrawal and now as a potential platform for supporting drone-based attacks.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Belarus was not formally involved. Though Russian forces launched their advance on Kyiv from Belarusian territory, which later evolved into such tragedies as the massacre in Bucha.
Russia failed to achieve its initial goal of capturing Kyiv in three days and in late March and early April of 2022, Russian forces withdrew from northern Ukraine. To learn more, see our analysis of what liberation of Ukrainian territories revealed.
Much of this retreat occurred through Belarusian territory, turning the country into a rear corridor for a regrouping army. There were also reported cases of using Belarusian post offices to send household appliances and personal belongings that Russians looted from Ukrainian homes. Wounded Russian soldiers were treated in Belarusian clinics, including those exposed to radioactive dust while digging trenches in the notorious Red Forest near Chornobyl.
Belarusian infrastructure was used in ways that extended far beyond the battlefield.
Over the course of the war, the Belarusian direction has not only been a source of direct military enablement for Russia but also a recurring source of tension and provocations along the Ukrainian border. Still, whether they are aerial threats or joint military training with Russian troops, no matter what, the official Kyiv's position remains clear:
Belarus is being used as an enabling platform for Russia's war. Ukraine does not seek a second front or war with its northern neighbour. Ukraine's goal is to protect its territory, not to open a new theatre of war.
Regional security response
Belarus's evolving role in the war has also reshaped the security calculations of its neighbours and NATO's eastern flank. For countries bordering Belarus, particularly Poland, Lithuania and Latvia,the war in Ukraine is no longer distant, it is a direct factor in national airspace management and defence planning.
Since 2022, there have been times when parts of the airspace near the Belarusian border were subject to temporary restrictions or tighter control measures. NATO has also strengthened its military posture along the eastern flank.
These measures reflected the need for adaptation to a new security reality in which the Minsk administration is no longer treated as the administration of a neutral neighbour, but as a potential launch area or environment for Russian military activity.
Unfortunately, even without crossing into direct confrontation, Belarus has become a central variable in European airspace security and military planning.
From the launch of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, through the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kyiv and into the current phase of drone-enabled warfare, Belarus has remained structurally involved in Russia's war against Ukraine.
This week attention has shifted from territory to infrastructure, in particular, communication systems and other enabling assets that can be leveraged for coordinated strikes. The reported disabling of such equipment following Ukrainian public pressure illustrates a small but crucial step for the Minsk administration in the longer trajectory - one in which Belarus can be further positioned within the mechanics of Russia's war effort, whether through geography or infrastructure, or it can choose another path in a moment when Europe's security order is being reshaped in real time.
This publication was compiled with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation. It's content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the International Renaissance Foundation.
