Four EU and NATO countries, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania, share more than 1,300 km of border with Ukraine. If Russia occupied Ukraine, that entire frontier would become a direct border with Russian-controlled territory.
However, the number itself is less important than what lies behind it: what would happen if Ukraine loses its independence? What would it mean for EU and NATO countries to have Russia directly on their borders, rather than Ukraine between them and Moscow?
UkraineWorld takes a closer look at this hypothetical scenario and examines what a Russian occupation of Ukraine could mean for Europe's security.
Military exercises, border fortifications, air defence systems, military units, and constant readiness for a possible attack will become part of everyday life for a much larger portion of EU and NATO countries.
For Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, or Romania, Russia's sense of security may change - Russian forces could deploy weapons and military infrastructure directly along the new frontier, reducing the distance and potentially warning time between Russian launch sites and NATO territory.
The threat would extend far beyond the countries directly bordering occupied Ukraine. A Russian tank may seem far away. A Russian missile or drone is a different story - they can travel hundreds or thousands of kilometres, putting targets across Europe within potential reach.
Сompilation and synthesis of OSINT and publicly available data, including Strategic Threat Index OSINT Research Platform, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Missile Threat database. Where specifications differ, figures are identified as assessed, estimated, reported or claimed values.
There are ongoing discussions about Ukrainian refugees - how they adapt, how they participate in the economy, and whether they are going to return to Ukraine. In a scenario where Ukraine loses its independence, many who currently hope to return would have no safe, independent Ukraine to return to.
Some Europeans see support for Ukraine as a costly choice. A Russian victory would mean a much longer and more exposed European frontier to defend and much higher security spending.
Businesses operating near Europe's eastern border would face higher risks to factories, warehouses, energy infrastructure, and transport routes, which could at least affect insurance costs.
For governments, this would mean not only spending more on troops and air defence but also investing in protecting critical infrastructure and making economies more resilient to disruption.
Ukraine has accumulated extraordinary experience in modern warfare, adapting drones, electronic warfare, battlefield software, maritime systems and precision weapons under the pressure of an ongoing war.
If Russia were to conquer much of Ukraine, it would potentially gain access to parts of this industrial and technological ecosystem, as well as to the knowledge accumulated through years of fighting.
Some Ukrainian defence facilities and equipment would undoubtedly be destroyed. Others, however, could be captured, repurposed or brought under Russian control. The same applies to infrastructure, production capacity and technical expertise.
Occupation would also mean control over people. In territories already occupied by Russia, Ukrainians have faced pressure, coercion and attempts to draw them into Russian state and military structures. So there is no way Russia would not use the Ukrainian army, its real-time experience and knowledge, with a goal to absorb Ukrainian military personnel, engineers and defence companies into its own military-industrial system.
Russia gradually took control of the Sea of Azov, turning geography into a tool of control and using possible levers of pressure. After the occupation of Crimea, Moscow gained control over a significant part of the coast, the Kerch Strait, Ukrainian maritime infrastructure, and later, after the full-scale invasion in 2022, seized main Ukrainian ports in the Azov Sea -- Mariupol and Berdyansk.
Such gradual capture and control allowed it to turn the sea into a tool of economic and military pressure.
If Russia occupies all of Ukraine, it will gain control over the entire Ukrainian Black Sea coast, from Crimea to the Danube. The Black Sea could transform from an area of international trade into a space where Moscow has significantly more opportunities to determine who can use it, how and when.
For Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and other Black Sea countries, this would mean the appearance of a much stronger Russia directly on the other side of the sea.
Ukrainians are already living the reality that Europe is trying to prevent from spreading.
After 4 years of full-scale war and 12 years since Russian aggression, Ukrainians have developed automatic ways of responding to danger, they do many of these things without even thinking about them.
Here are just a few examples of how war has changed Ukrainians' everyday habits.
Ukrainians are fighting for their independence, their freedom and their right to decide their own future. They are also fighting to prevent Russia's war from becoming a precedent for further aggression. However, the security effect of that resistance extends far beyond Ukraine's borders.
This is what Ukraine's defence means for Europe and NATO: it keeps the battlefield away and prevents Russia from moving it closer to European homes.
UkraineWorld encourages you to discover more:
THE DENIED WAR: The Russian Grey-Zone Aggression against Europe and Its Unfolding Trajectory
International Security Risks in the Azov-Black Sea Region in November-December 2021
