Vladimir Putin's pans of aggression have been evident for more than a decade, dating back to his 2007 speech in Munich. Later, he openly stated that he views interstate relations through the prism of time and distance. In particular, he noted said many years before the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 how long it would take a missile to hit Moscow if launched from various European countries and Ukraine.
First, Russia's perception of itself as a great power is deeply embedded in its national identity, shaped by centuries of imperial and Soviet history. This image is crucial in understanding its need to assert itself globally and its sensitivity to being sidelined in international affairs.
Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was seen not just as a geopolitical setback, as Putin and his proxies emphasized many times, but considered a personal humiliation which today drives its leadership to restore its status as a primary global influencer.
In Putin's view, this historical injustice motivates Russia to project power and influence in regions it considers crucial to its strategic interests, such as Ukraine, Syria, and the Baltic States. Therefore, since the 2000s, the Russia-U.S. relationship has been characterized by a desire to negotiate from a position of perceived equality.
Russia's interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, followed by the annexation of Crimea, are examples of its approach to reclaiming its great power status and asserting its sovereignty and influence in the face of Western opposition.
Therefore, it is essential to distinguish what specific goals Russia wants to achieve geopolitically with the current war.
Russia has masterfully twisted Western claims regarding the need to change the system of international relations. After the end of the Cold War, Western leaders believed in democracy and hoped that the trend would also spread to Russia. After several unsuccessful attempts to align with the West, Putin's Russia has never wavered in its belief that it's strong enough to be considered a major power rival of the US.
One of the injunctions issued to the West, prior to Russia launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine
, was returning NATO back to its 1997 composition and borders. Putin repeatedly claimed that President Clinton promised Putin's predecessor, Yeltsin, that NATO borders would not be expanded eastward. According to declassified White House transcripts between the two presidents, no such promise was made at the time, neither privately nor officially. In 2021, the Russians were also aware it would change nothing, yet the Kremlin's propaganda
needed to put the concept in motion and declare it as a status quo that needed complete recognition. They wanted to show that the West does not understand the nature of Russia's goals.
Russia doesn't conceal its true intentions, as the Russian foreign ministry board openly advocates action to weaken the United States. The Russian foreign ministry says that it is America and its allies that are in conflict with Russia (not vice versa).
The Russian military doctrine document
, revised after Russia's aggression in 2022 against Ukraine, defines several key threats to Moscow:
NATO is increasing its military potential and global role while violating international law by expanding its presence near Russia's borders.
Deploying military contingents near Russia and its allies to exert political and military pressure.
In doing so,Russia wants to demonstrate that providing assistance to Ukraine is a burden that Western countries cannot bear. The year 2024 is in full swing of elections, and Russia hopes to promote these talking points, especially in those countries that have assisted Ukraine the most. The two most prominent supporters of Ukraine are having elections, the European Parliament elections in June 2024 and the US presidential and congressional elections in November 2024.
In the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war
and the comprehensive sanctions imposed, Russia seeks to achieve the lifting of all major sanctions, including restrictions on oil exports to Europe.
For many years, Russia has claimed that Europe would freeze without Russian gas if sanctions were to be imposed. Consequently, Russia has sought new export routes in Asia. Russia's continued bombing of Ukraine's energy infrastructure has prompted Ukraine to respond with attacks on Russian oil refineries, which generate revenue for the Russian war effort. By demonstrating resilience and the ability to find alternative markets, Russia hopes to pressure the West into negotiating from a position of strength and secure the lifting of sanctions.
Putin has been "reelected" for another term as Russia's president. The way he addresses the "special military operation," as Russians refer to the full-scale war on Ukraine, is a critical factor in Russian domestic policy.
He needs the war to justify increasing defense spending, mobilizing more men to fight, and deflecting attention away from the lack of economic growth for the internal audience. By prolonging the conflict, Putin aims
to rally nationalistic fervor and suppress dissent, thereby maintaining his grip on power. The ongoing war serves as a tool for internal propaganda, bolstering his regime's stability despite economic challenges.
The geopolitical objectives of Russia's aggression against Ukraine are multifaceted but primarily directed at the USA and the West generally. The Kremlin seeks to rewrite the European security order and diminish Western resolve by exploiting narratives that portray the U.S. efforts in supporting Ukraine as prolonging the war.
Russia aims to negotiate from a position of perceived equality, leveraging historical grievances and disinformation campaigns to weaken Western unity and influence global perceptions. Understanding that approach underlines the West's need to counteract Russia's disinformation tactics and strategic maneuvering in the geopolitical arena.
