For many years, the topic of returning to "traditional family values" has been a key component of Russian propaganda. Firstly, it helps to construct the binary opposition between Russia and the West that is associated with democratic values, human rights, gender equality, and LGBTIQ+ rights. Secondly, it is a powerful tool to appeal to people's fears based on stereotypes about the place of men and women in society and women's rights in general. Thirdly, appealing to "traditional gender norms" is used as a tool of war: while men are encouraged to serve in the army in order to "defend the Motherland" from fictional threats from the West, the primary role of women has been reduced to mothers of future soldiers. Finally, Russia uses this image of "the defender of traditional family values" as an export product and "sells" it for foreign audiences, even though this is just a image of propaganda that has no connection to reality.
Though this topic has been used by Russian propagandists since the mid 2000s, after the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has become even more visible in the public discourse, as far as gender relations have been also weaponised in today's Russia.
Laws prohibiting the so-called "propaganda of being child-free" are one of the most visible examples of Russia's policy aimed at strengthening the totalitarian gender order in terms of women's rights.
On 23 November 2024, Russia's President signed the law banning propaganda of "refusal to bear child".
It was defined as a tool to "keep and protect Russian spiritual and moral values" from the activity of the so-called "child-free ideology" targeting young people in Russia. It is worth noting that there was one aspect that was removed from the second reading of the legislation. That is, the part citing a monastic way of life isn't defined as "childfree propaganda".
Such a decision is easily explained: the Russian Orthodox Church is closely connected to the Russian government and intelligence services. It also lobbies on various initiatives that restrict women's and LGBTIQ+ rights. In particular, the legislation banning abortions in the country plays a major role in the organisation of so-called "family forums" in Russia.
These events, in fact, sell the image of Russia as a "saviour of traditional family values" for foreign audiences and disseminate anti-Western narratives playing on stereotypes about gender equality and LGBTIQ+ people.
These legislative changes are logically linked to statements that were disseminated in the public discourse by Russian political and civil actors. For example, the member of Russian Duma Aleksandr Iltiakov stated in the interview that the war could have begun because of women who have abortions or don't want to bear children.
In addition to this, he claimed that women should bear children as long as they can and "spiritual values must be instilled from the kindergarten". Similar claims about "teaching girls to be mothers and wives at schools" or uselessness of education for young girls also appeared in the Russian informational environment by other public figures, reinforcing the discourse about maternity and marriage as the major life scenarios for young girls.
In addition to changes in legislation restricting reproductive rights and claims by public figures legitimising gender stereotypes, Russian government figures also legitimise early pregnancies - everything to increase birth rates. For example, another member of the Russian Duma Anna Kuznietsova stated that women have to bear the first child when they are 20 so as to bear 3 and more children and make Russia closer to "the vision of future Russia's President desires".
Even though this quote seems to be quite innocent and bureaucratic, it contains a much deeper meaning. Given that 20 is the age at when many young people begin their studies at universities and choose their life path, the only "correct" self-realisation for a woman defined by the state is to marry and begin bearing children from a young age.
This case is not unique.
Another member of the Russian Duma Andrey Kutiepov stated that women who gave birth to children within a year of applying to university or college should gain extra points, because a child is an "achievement of its own that should be praised with maximal extra points". It is worth mentioning that normally, students enrol into universities in Russia at the age of 17 or 18. Therefore, the member of Parliament quoted above, in fact, supports teenage pregnancies.
Mass culture in Russia also supports this discourse. One of the major Russian entertaining channels "U" broadcasts the TV reality show "Mom in 16" showing stories of young girls. Though this format is not new and similar shows were broadcasted in other countries, only in Russia it was renamed from "Pregnant in 16" into "Mom in 16", that normalises teenage pregnancies in front of a large audience.
In addition to re-naming, there aren't even remarks about contraception or abortion if a teenage pregnancy were to occur, as well as mechanisms to defend victims of domestic violence. However, many participants of the show face gender based violence, poverty, alcohol and drug addictions at home or in "relations".
Another case is the new show "Maternity House`s Everyday Life" - a show created as a part of an information campaign that supports projects of "Demography" and "Healthcare." Such TV shows demonstrate the "day in the life" of work in maternity hospitals. This project is more sophisticated than the previously mentioned, but it also works with the same mission in mind - push the narrative about the role of mother as the main role for a woman in Russia.
To conclude, the Russian government actively implements typical course expected from totalitarian regimes, discourse that aims at returning "traditional gender roles" as the status-quo. In reality this means reducing all women to a role of mother and wife - a campaign which serves Russia's future wars and expansionist ambitions
. Therefore, the narrative about "protecting family values" is nothing more than a guise in a well-planned strategy of weaponisation of gender relations.
The article was originally published on the Kremlin's voice platform.
