Kyiv’s forces continue to resist one of the largest militaries with fewer men and a shrinking arsenal. The outcome of this war will not be decided solely by Ukraine’s courage, but by whether the world chooses to keep that courage armed and the aggressor out of resources.
Ukraine’s military performance has been marked by determined defense but limited offensive breakthroughs. Since 2022, Ukrainian forces recaptured some ground, but Russian forces were able to seize additional areas in 2023–2025 at heavy cost.
NATO’s Secretary General Mark Rutte recently assessed that the battlefield has been “difficult” for Ukraine and that Russian gains in 2024–2025 were “limited” but achieved at extremely high casualty rates.
Russia’s economy has been hit hard by sanctions, but it has found ways to keep its war machine running. Contrary to early forecasts of rapid collapse, Russia’s leadership has poured unprecedented resources into the military-industrial complex. Experts note that Russia’s wartime economy has been underwritten by a mix of commodity revenue, aid from partners, and state-directed production.
Energy exports still fund roughly 30% of the federal budget, and although Western price caps have driven Russian oil and gas revenues down (to about half their pre-war level), Moscow continues to export by sophisticated workarounds (for example, using “shadow” tankers and routing more gas through Türkiye).
By late 2025, Russia is spending roughly 7-8% of its GDP on defense. Civilian factories have been repurposed for tanks, ammo and drones; the military budget reportedly covers 40% of the federal budget. Russia also sources weapons and technology from China, Iran, and North Korea, partly offsetting sanctions. For example, Moscow now produces tens of thousands of attack drones annually, some reportedly with foreign assistance.
In sum, analysts from institutions like CSIS conclude that Russia can sustain its current war effort for several more years.
Only a prolonged deep recession or internal unrest (neither likely anytime soon) would force it to the negotiating table.
On the Ukrainian side, the economy is heavily strained by the war. Ukraine’s government now devotes roughly 60% of its budget to the war effort (troop pay, equipment, etc.).
Without constant infusions of Western grants and loans, Ukraine could quickly run out of money for basic needs like pensions and fuel. Earlier in 2025 Ukraine and the IMF agreed that Ukraine faces a financing gap of about $65 billion through 2027. Meeting that gap depends on sustained international aid.
The U.S. has shifted to a mechanism called the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), where NATO countries pool money to supply U.S. equipment to Ukraine. In October 2025 NATO Secretary General Rutte highlighted that PURL is delivering U.S. air-defense and artillery systems paid for by Europe.
Meanwhile, the so-called “coalition of the willing” of 50+ countries meets regularly to coordinate aid. At an October meeting in London leaders pledged to cut off Russia’s fuel revenues and send additional missiles and air defenses to Ukraine.
At the same time, Ukraine has repeatedly warned of shortages in high-end weapons and especially ammunition. Western officials privately admit that for most of the war Ukraine was “massively outgunned” by Russian artillery due to supply shortfalls.
For example, in mid-2024 U.S. production of 155mm artillery shells was only about 40,000 per month and months away from its goal of 100,000 per month. Even as the U.S. and Europe rush to open new plants, Ukraine at times has had to ration shells and delay counterattacks.
In August 2025, U.S. defense leaders warned that they would not meet the 100,000‑shell-per-month target until mid-2026. The shortage is not just in artillery: Ukraine also needs millions of small arms rounds, armored vehicles, and drones faster than current production allows.
Each new big Russian assault or siege (as at Pokrovsk) requires massive resupplies to blunt it. Economically, Ukraine must keep funding its government and military – something it can only do with external grants and loans. Allies’ continued involvement (in NATO exercises, training, and intelligence-sharing) also boosts Ukraine’s capabilities.
Neither side is in a clear path to “victory” as of late 2025.
Russia’s forces hold more ground, but they suffer devastating losses for each yard gained.
Ukraine’s military has proven highly motivated and has benefited from advanced Western weapons, but it lacks sufficient quantities of the very systems (shells, air defenses, heavy artillery) needed to turn defense into a decisive counterattack. Allied leaders stress that maintaining the status quo – a well-armed Ukraine that can deny major Russian advances – is in itself a strategic goal.
In practice, Ukraine’s survival and eventual outcome depend on whether NATO countries keep supplying arms. Ukraine (population ~38 million) cannot replace casualties as easily as Russia (~144 million); even with Russia’s higher losses, Ukraine faces “more severe manpower shortages” from long attrition battles.
Many analysts describe the war as a war of attrition, dominated by artillery fire. In fact, about 80% of battlefield casualties on both sides have been caused by artillery shells and missiles. Recent reports note that in fall 2024 a sudden drop in Ukrainian artillery fire (from ~10,000 rounds per day) caused Ukrainian daily deaths to triple, underlining how critical sustained firepower is.
Ukraine’s population has fallen by roughly 10 million people (about a quarter) since 2022 due to war casualties, low birth rates and migration.
Nearly 95,000 cases of defenders going "absent without leave" (AWOL) and desertion have been recorded since 2022, the majority in 2024, reflecting how exhausted many soldiers have become. Some frontline units have even started accepting deserters back to duty to fill gaps.
Generals say Russian infantry forces currently outnumber Ukrainians on many front sectors by up to 10-to-1. Exhausted Ukrainian brigades have had to hold long shifts without relief. Units report that without a steady flow of fresh replacements, even defensive positions risk being overrun.
Ukraine’s survival depends not only on the courage of its soldiers or the ingenuity of its commanders, but on the continuity and scale of Western support. On the battlefield, Ukraine’s forces have proven that determination and tactical innovation can hold off a far larger adversary. Yet determination alone cannot substitute for ammunition, air defenses, or manpower reserves. In an attritional war where artillery dominance, drone swarms, and sustained logistics decide outcomes, shortages are as deadly as enemy offensives.
Russia’s war economy has reoriented itself entirely toward long-term war. It produces shells, missiles, and drones on an industrial scale, supported by shadow trade networks and partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea. Despite sanctions, Moscow can still fund its war machine for several years at current intensity. Ukraine, in contrast, remains dependent on the collective effort of the West - not just for weapons, but for budgetary survival.
